OPEN LETTER TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR

For the urgent attention of:
The Rt Hon David Lammy MP
Deputy Prime Minister
Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice
Ministry of Justice

15th May 2026

Re: Urgent request for constitutional protection, ministerial oversight and investigation into alleged unequal protection, police-backed property deprivation and failure of effective remedy

Dear Lord Chancellor,

A. Constitutional standing and scope of intervention

I address you in your constitutional capacity as Lord Chancellor, the office responsible for upholding the rule-of-law settlement and the continued functioning of a justice system capable of equal protection.

I do not ask you to reverse any judicial decision, direct any court, or decide private litigation. I ask you to address the constitutional question that remains within ministerial responsibility: what mechanism ensures that civil justice safeguards operate equally, effectively and lawfully where coercive state power is used to deprive a family of home, property, evidence and intergenerational wealth?

Judicial independence is essential, but it is a protection for lawful adjudication, not a constitutional shield for unlawful institutional closure. It protects judges from political interference; it does not immunise a documented pattern in which BAME litigants are allegedly denied trial, disclosure, evidence-testing, protection from unlawful eviction, police accountability, HMCTS access and effective oversight while property rights are extinguished through untested premises. Independence cannot convert non-adjudication into adjudication. It cannot protect apparent bias, unequal forensic treatment, unexplained departures from law, or coercive state-backed consequences imposed without fair process.

The concern is not one adverse order. It is a cumulative pattern in which protective law exists in form, but was repeatedly withheld in substance.

B. Attached schedules and evidential basis

Three schedules are attached to make clear that this letter is not a general complaint about losing litigation, nor an invitation for the Ministry to re-decide private rights. The schedules identify the safeguards, powers, records and remedies said to have failed,

and require a constitutional answer as to where effective protection existed in substance.

Schedule 1 — Unequal forensic treatment across courts and tribunals

This schedule identifies the repeated procedural pattern across more than twelve court and tribunal proceedings: untried fraud treated as rejected fraud, disclosure refused, expert evidence shut out, substantial defences treated as disposable, HNW's contradictions accommodated, and finality attached to non-adjudication. It is relied upon to show that the complaint is cumulative and institutional, not one adverse order.

Schedule 2 — Police and oversight: law not applied, protection not provided

This schedule identifies the police powers, statutory safeguards and oversight routes said to have failed in relation to police-backed exclusion, forced entry, property interference, missing body-worn footage, refusal to identify lawful authority, and the absence of effective accountability. It is relied upon to show that the deprivation of property was not only judicial or private, but involved coercive state power.

Schedule 3 — Core documentary record, chronology and continuing harm

This schedule identifies photographs, smashed windows, continuing property interference and public-order risk. It also addresses the expert report said to confirm the forged or composite-instrument issue, the refusal of protective relief, and the continuing harm. It is relied upon to show why the matter now requires urgent constitutional scrutiny and cannot be answered by general references to ordinary remedies.

The schedules are not put forward as a substitute for trial. They are put forward to identify the question that has never been answered: where, in any court, tribunal, police process, HMCTS process or oversight process, were the protective safeguards actually applied?

C. The constitutional failure: protective law withheld in substance

Where a discernible pattern of unequal protection appears across civil litigation, enforcement, HMCTS administration, policing and oversight, each institution may say that the matter belongs elsewhere. But the cumulative effect is constitutional. The law against fraud, forgery, unlawful eviction, police overreach, proof-destruction and discriminatory treatment may exist on paper, yet become inaccessible in fact.

Property rights are said to be protected by fraud law, deed formalities, escrow rules, disclosure duties, injunctive relief, possession safeguards, police-power limits, appellate review and oversight routes. But if each safeguard is withheld at the point it is needed, the question is no longer whether rights formally exist. The question is whether they are practically enforceable.

The present concern has moved beyond private litigation. Regular forced entries, smashed windows, police-backed exclusion, refused injunctions and unresolved allegations of forged or composite instruments have created a public-order risk. Neighbours and onlookers have reportedly described the atmosphere in racialised terms, including as a "race war". That language is not used lightly.

The courts refused protective injunctive relief. Police power was then allegedly deployed in circumstances where no court order, warrant, certified bailiff or possession authority has been identified. HMCTS, police oversight and complaints bodies have not provided a route by which the legality of the cumulative failure can be examined.

Case history and apparent bias

At first instance, DHCJ Andrew Lenon KC used strike-out and summary judgment as a substitute for trial. Fraud, forgery, escrow release, receiver authority, possession, TOLATA rights and unlawful eviction were all plainly live. Yet each of those issues was treated as disposable when raised by Black litigants against a represented corporate lender, while HNW received the benefit of assumption, correction, substitution and enforcement. Under CPR 55.8, once a defence "appears substantial", the court should give directions. It should not close the case as though disclosure, metadata, native files, cross-examination and trial had already taken place. The allegation that signature pages were transplanted from an agreed £900,000 deed onto materially different £1.6 million terms, while Ms Lawrence was on a transatlantic flight, was self-evidently substantial. Treating it as insubstantial required the court to bypass the evidential consequence of its own premise and to withhold the safeguards by which truth is tested. The racial significance is not asserted as motive; it arises from effect: the protective rule existed, but it did not protect the Black litigants when their home, property and documentary fraud allegations were at stake.

In another case at Wandsworth County Court, DJ Parker used the same CPR 55.8 gateway in the same impermissible way, treating serious fraud, escrow delivery and document-proven dispute as though they did not even appear substantial. The same safeguard was again converted into a mechanism of disposal. A rule designed to identify cases requiring trial was used to prevent trial. The repetition matters. If this had occurred once, it might be characterised as error. Repetition across courts makes it a pattern of unequal procedural protection.

In both cases, the transcripts of those hearings then went missing despite repeated requests. After at least 12 requests, the courts were still unable to produce them. Litigants are told not to make private recordings because the court record is said to be the reliable public record. Yet here the court record could not be obtained. That failure is not administrative inconvenience; it removes the evidence needed to prove how the safeguard was bypassed. Where the missing record concerns hearings in which Black

litigants say fraud and unlawful possession were shut out, the absence of the transcript compounds the appearance of institutional non-accountability.

Lenon KC then reformulated HNW's case. HNW's pleaded case was, verbatim, "it is HNW's case that Mrs Lawrence signed". Lenon KC recast it as: "it is not HNW's case that Ms Lawrence signed the version of the Agreement containing the manuscript annotations." That was not neutral case management. It was a judicial rewriting of the issue. It removed the sharp fraud/forgery question, softened HNW's evidential burden, and stripped Ms Lawrence of the safeguards that the pleaded allegation required. Objectively viewed, that was a descent into the arena. It also creates a stark comparator: HNW's pleaded case was judicially softened, while Ms Lawrence's fraud case was hardened into "insubstantiality" before disclosure or trial. That is the appearance of unequal forensic treatment.

Nugee LJ and Andrews LJ then repeated the same process failure and the same unequal credibility pattern: HNW's position was treated as capable of being saved by inference, reformulation and chronology, while the Black litigants' documentary fraud case was treated as answered without the safeguards required to test it. Despite independent evidence of document manipulation, they stated that they were "not persuaded that there has been any fraud", without disclosure, metadata, native files, cross-examination, expert testing or trial. That was not an adjudication of fraud. It was premature finality imposed on an untried allegation while the route to proof was foreclosed. The effect was racially significant because a Black family's allegation of property fraud was not investigated through ordinary trial safeguards, while the represented corporate claimant retained the benefit of enforcement, possession and finality.

Nugee LJ and Andrews LJ also created an unsupported escrow-delivery premise that HNW had not advanced. Contrary to HNW's verified pleaded case and the stamped receipt/documentary record that the legal charges were held on 14 November 2018, the judges created a chronology that recorded that the charges were provided "directly after completion", when the materials identified earlier escrow transmission. That unsupported delivery chronology supplied the missing factual bridge for HNW's case and avoided the real escrow failure: no lawful act of release for the materially different £1.6 million terms was identified. That is not a neutral omission where the missing chronology is the bridge by which one party obtains enforcement and the other loses property without trial. The unsupported premise created by Nugee LJ and Andrews LJ operated entirely in favour of HNW and entirely against the Black litigants.

The refusal of protective relief is graver still. Ms Lawrence complained of illegal evictions, board-ups, smashed windows, displaced and distressed Black occupiers, harassment and property interference, and asked the court for protection. Nugee LJ and Andrews LJ refused relief, stating that it was "difficult to see the harm". Since then, the

evictions, smashed windows, harassment and property interference have escalated, as evidenced in attached Schedule 3. The court's refusal did not merely fail to protect; it treated pleaded and continuing harm as legally invisible and enabled the continuation of the very harm it declined to restrain. For Black occupiers facing forced entry, smashed windows, exclusion and displacement, that judicial minimisation carries an obvious public-confidence consequence: the law appeared capable of recognising HNW's enforcement interests, but incapable of recognising Black occupiers' need for protection.

A CPR 52.30 application is precisely the mechanism by which these integrity failures should be addressed. Consistent with UCP Plc v Nectrus and the principle that a process-integrity challenge should not be determined by the same constitution whose reasoning is directly impugned, the application should be reviewed by a different judge or constitution. Instead, when the documented factual errors were placed before the Court, Nugee LJ and Andrews LJ maintained a position that cannot be reconciled with the record. Clear factual errors were allowed to stand. That is another example of the central problem: the corrective mechanisms exist in form, but when invoked by these Applicants, they are disabled in substance and no effective remedy is provided.

Lady Justice Andrews has now gone further by raising the threat of a Civil Restraint Order. That is constitutionally serious. A label of "totally without merit" does not make an application without merit where the substance has never been tried, the documents have never been tested, disclosure has been refused, and the chronology relied upon by the court is itself challenged as false. A Civil Restraint Order in that context would convert virtual exclusion into actual exclusion: first the litigant is denied trial, then denied disclosure, then denied correction of factual error, and finally threatened with restraint for persisting in asking the court to apply the law. If judges can supply chronology, reformulate a corporate claimant's pleaded case, refuse the safeguards required to test a Black family's fraud and property-deprivation case, and then use restraint powers to prevent correction, property rights are not protected by law; they exist only at judicial discretion. That is not merely a private litigation concern. Where homes, family security, race-related public confidence, unlawful evictions and property deprivation are involved, this becomes a public-order issue requiring immediate institutional correction.

It is important to note that Judge Sara Hargreaves of the First-tier Tribunal allowed registrations to proceed while live allegations of fraud remained undetermined. When told that this approach was wrong, the Judge did not correct the error but repeated it. When challenged, Judge Hargreaves debarred me, giving no reasons despite repeated requests.

The Applicants do not need to prove conscious racial animus for the concern to be constitutionally serious. The question is objective. A fair-minded and informed observer

would ask why, across repeated courts and tribunals, a represented corporate lender received correction, indulgence, assumption and enforcement, while Black litigants received disbelief, evidential foreclosure, missing transcripts, refusal of protection, and threatened restraint. That is the appearance of unequal protection. It is precisely the kind of institutional pattern that undermines confidence in civil justice even where no individual decision-maker admits or recognises bias.

The same pattern has repeated across courts and tribunals. It is not isolated error. It is systematic non-application of protective law with a racialised practical effect: the represented corporate claimant received the benefit of procedural flexibility, evidential assumption and enforcement finality, while Black litigants received disbelief, procedural exclusion, loss of home, loss of property and threatened restraint. TOLATA, Mercury, Takhar, Stack, Porter, Serafin and the Protection from Eviction Act can all be read, but they were not applied. This is not adjudication. It is a manufactured endpoint: proof foreclosed, safeguards withheld, untested premises hardened into finality, and one party made the winner. Objectively viewed, this is a process failure inconsistent with adjudication according to law. It cannot command public confidence, respect for the courts, or obedience to the rule of law.

D. Evidence of unequal protection and discriminatory effect

On the material set out in Schedule 1, HMCTS and the courts did not merely produce a loaded process. They produced what appears to be a manufactured endpoint: a procedural end-state in which non-determination was converted into determination, untried fraud was treated as rejected fraud, missing proof was treated as proof against the party denied disclosure, and finality was attached before adjudication occurred.

I ask any institution relying on these outcomes to identify the adjudicative event by which the core issues were fairly and lawfully determined. The answer must identify the court or tribunal, the date, the issue tried, the legal test applied, the disclosure ordered, the native files or metadata examined, the expert evidence admitted, the witnesses cross-examined, and the findings made on fraud, forgery, escrow release, receiver authority, police power, unlawful eviction and the beneficiary's occupation rights.

It is not enough to point to orders, refusals of permission, labels of "totally without merit", or procedural finality. The question is whether the underlying legality was ever adjudicated by the safeguards required by law. If those safeguards were withheld, the institution must identify how fairness survived their removal. If no such adjudicative event can be identified, the conclusion is not rhetorical. It is evidential: this matter has not been fairly decided; it has been closed. Finality has been attached to non-adjudication.

The same failure then moved from adjudication to coercive enforcement. Surrey Police completed the loop. Registered owners and occupiers were removed from their home

without warrant, court order, certified bailiff or any identified lawful power. Private actors asserted that the Black family had no right to occupy an expensive house, relying on a racially loaded assumption about who was entitled to be there. Police officers crossed the boundary, remained for hours, forced the family, including children, out of occupation, searched for keys, and facilitated the taking of property. CCTV is said to capture the incident. Body-worn video was allegedly unavailable for the critical period. Property worth over £500,000 was then lost or taken. Schedule 2 identifies the police powers and legal safeguards said to have been breached.

The comparator is unavoidable. Would police officers attend without warrant, court order, possession order, certified bailiff or identified statutory power to remove a white registered proprietor from a residential property because a group of Black private actors asserted that the white family had no right to live there? If the answer is no, the disparity requires an institutional explanation. If the answer is yes, the Ministry should identify the statutory power that made the exclusion lawful.

E. Structural conditions that enable inequality

Discretion is necessary to justice. It allows legal rules to be applied to particular facts. But discretion is also the space in which unequal protection can be produced while preserving the outward form of legality.

That is the concern here. Judicial, administrative and police discretion were repeatedly exercised in a way that protected one side, disbelieved the other, refused proof-routes, denied interim protection, excused missing evidence, minimised property damage and then attached finality to the resulting closure.

When control of proof becomes proof-destruction, process ceases to be neutral. Where defence materials are allegedly destroyed during unlawful evictions, metadata and native files are not disclosed, expert evidence is refused or excluded, and the absence of proof is then used against the party denied access to proof, the system manufactures the evidential deficit on which it later relies.

One error can be accidental. A repeated sequence of displaced CPR rules, untried fraud allegations, ignored binding authorities, refused injunctions, missing police footage, spoliation without inference and oversight bodies declining substance requires an institutional account.

The result is a protection vacuum. Rights without institutional enforcement are not rights in any meaningful constitutional sense. They become promises written in law but denied in practice.

F. Institutional racism: Macpherson and Lammy applied to civil justice

I raise institutional racism because this pattern falls squarely within the kind of institutional failure identified by Macpherson: a collective failure to provide an

appropriate and professional service because of colour, culture or ethnic origin. The point is not that every individual judge, officer or official must be shown to have consciously intended discrimination. The point is what the institution produced.

The Lammy Review applied that lens to justice and required unexplained racial disparity to be explained or reformed. That matters because institutional racism rarely announces itself openly. It appears through process: disbelief, opacity, unequal treatment, defensive closure, lack of scrutiny, refusal of protection and outcomes unsupported by evidence.

Here, a corporate claimant's case was accepted, repaired and protected. A Black family's case was compressed, disbelieved and closed. Allegations of forged instruments, unlawful eviction, police misconduct, beneficiary rights and evidence destruction were treated as collateral, too late, already determined or outside jurisdiction.

The pattern is not merely adverse outcomes. It is the allocation of procedural dignity: one side received correction, assumption, indulgence and enforcement; the other received disbelief, compression, exclusion and finality.

That pattern demands an institutional answer.

G. The closed-loop failure of remedies

The closed loop is unavoidable. Courts say appeal. Appellate courts say finality. HMCTS says it cannot alter orders. Complaints bodies say they cannot examine judicial decisions. Police oversight says standards were met. Fresh claims face res judicata, limitation or abuse of process. Judicial review is treated as unavailable or circular. When every oversight route refuses to restore lawful adjudication or protection, participation becomes illusory.

Finality is legitimate only when it follows lawful adjudication. It is illegitimate when it replaces it.

How can BAME citizens trust court orders if the legal tests required for disclosure, fraud, possession, beneficiary rights, eviction legality and police powers are not applied, and then the resulting outcome is treated as final? That is not neutrality. It is bias in process.

If BAME families can lose homes, evidence, property portfolios and intergenerational wealth without trial, this is no longer private litigation. It is civil-justice failure.

That is coercion without protection: the institutional failure Macpherson identified and Lammy required public bodies to confront.

H. Questions requiring a constitutional answer on access to justice and remedy

The attached schedules show that ordinary safeguards and remedies were not merely unavailable in theory; they were repeatedly withheld in practice. They cannot be a stock answer unless the Ministry explains how they remained effective here. Otherwise, the remedy is illusory.

Where the same institutions that refused to apply binding authority also control appeal, set aside, listing, sealing, complaint and enforcement routes, ordinary remedies cannot be assumed effective. The schedules show that protections against fraud, forgery, escrow breach, consideration failure, non est factum, unlawful eviction, police overreach and loss of beneficiary rights were not applied when needed. If no forum exists to correct that failure, that cannot be a satisfactory constitutional answer.

The question is constitutional and remedial: can the process remain legitimate, and what mechanism makes that legitimacy real?

Although the immediate harm concerns property, home, evidence and intergenerational wealth, the wider issue is access to justice. A single adverse decision might be dismissed as ordinary litigation error. But where the same protection failures appear across more than twelve court and tribunal proceedings, HMCTS administration, police conduct and oversight routes, the pattern is no longer isolated. It raises whether BAME litigants can obtain effective legal protection in substance, not merely formal access to courts, tribunals and complaint bodies.

H1. Constitutional principle: non-adjudication, proof-prevention and finality

1. Where fraud, disclosure, expert testing, police power, eviction legality and beneficiary rights were never tried, and the legal tests required for lawful determination were withheld, what specific constitutional or legal mechanism converted non-adjudication into lawful adjudication? Please identify the mechanism, authority and principle relied upon.

2. If disclosure, trial, cross-examination and evidence-testing were refused, thereby creating proof-prevention and a manufactured endpoint, what constitutional principle permits procedural finality to supply legitimacy that lawful adjudication itself never supplied?

H2. Constitutional legality: police power

3. Identify the precise statutory power relied upon for the police-backed exclusion on 14 July 2021, or confirm that no such power has been identified. If existing oversight bodies have already declined substance, what mechanism remains to ensure accountability for police-assisted exclusion without identified lawful authority?

H3. Constitutional remedy: institutional closure and effective domestic protection

4. Which single institution has jurisdiction and responsibility to examine cumulative institutional failure where courts, HMCTS, police, police oversight, JCIO, IOPC and other bodies each decline substance or rely on another body's decision?

5. If HMCTS says the issue is judicial, judicial review says the matter is judicial or unavailable, and appeal/set-aside routes repeat the same closure, what operative constitutional mechanism remains capable of examining institutional closure itself?

6. If no body has power to examine and correct a multi-forum pattern in which binding authority and protective safeguards were allegedly refused, does the Ministry accept that BAME property rights are left without effective domestic protection? If not, identify the forum that can provide restoration, correction, accountability or compensation before families are required to surrender homes, property and intergenerational wealth.

H4. Constitutional obedience and Convention challenge

7. In light of the attached schedules, does the Ministry accept that obedience to court orders presupposes an effective, impartial and Convention-compliant route to challenge orders alleged to have been produced by non-adjudication, unequal protection, procedural manufacture, proof-prevention or systematic non-application of binding authority? If that route has failed to apply ordinary safeguards, Article 6 fairness, Article 8 home and family protection, A1P1 property rights and Article 14 equal protection, what constitutional safeguard remains?

I. Limits of judicial independence and ministerial responsibility

Non-adjudication cannot become lawful adjudication through procedural finality alone. Finality cannot supply what the process withheld: disclosure, trial, cross-examination, expert testing, evidence evaluation and lawful determination. Where appeal, set aside, complaint, IOPC, civil claim or judicial review repeat the same closure, those routes cease to be effective remedies and become part of the defect.

The question is not whether a minister may decide an individual case. It is what the Lord Chancellor will do, within ministerial responsibility, where the record shows multi-forum departures from safeguards, equal treatment, natural justice, access to justice, property protection and human-rights compliance.

J. Constitutional mechanism, responsibility and remedy required

The Ministry is not asked to substitute itself for a court or to decide private rights. Nor is the Ministry being asked to treat one adverse case as proof of a system-wide

conclusion. The point is that the repeated pattern across more than twelve proceedings and oversight routes is itself the evidence requiring a systemic answer.

The Ministry is asked to identify the constitutional machinery by which a documented protection failure can be examined, halted where harm is continuing, investigated where police power is alleged to have been misused, and remedied where loss of home, property, evidence and intergenerational wealth has already occurred.

I therefore ask the Lord Chancellor to:

J1. Examination mechanism

1. Identify the existing lawful mechanism capable of examining the cumulative failure across the courts, HMCTS, police, police oversight and other public bodies where each body declines substance or relies on another body's decision.

a. If HMCTS says the issue is judicial, and judicial review says the issue is judicial or unavailable, what mechanism remains to examine whether administrative handling and judicial finality have combined to produce institutional closure?

J2. Police-investigation mechanism

2. Identify the mechanism for investigating police involvement where officers allegedly assisted exclusion from residential property without requiring a warrant, possession order, certified bailiff, or identified statutory power, and where oversight bodies have not required that power to be identified.

J3. Responsible authority

3. Identify the public authority, office or constitutional body responsible for examining a multi-forum pattern of unexplained departures from safeguards, equal treatment, natural justice, property protection and human-rights compliance, if the Ministry says it cannot examine the pattern directly.

J4. Urgent protective remedy

4. Identify what urgent protection exists now where property damage has occurred, continues to occur, and police-assisted or tolerated exclusion is alleged without any identified possession order or lawful authority. This is no longer merely a private dispute; it is a public-order and rule-of-law emergency.

J5. Corrective remedy

5. Confirm whether the Ministry accepts that judicial independence is not a shield for institutional racism, apparent bias, unequal protection, or unexplained multi-forum departures from law and safeguards. If it accepts that principle, identify

the remedy where such departures have caused loss of home, property, evidence and intergenerational wealth.

K. Consequence of no effective remedy

If no effective route exists, the constitutional position is untenable. BAME communities would be expected to obey and trust a civil justice system in which access to justice exists formally but not effectively: property can be lost without trial, alleged fraud can proceed without disclosure or expert testing, evictions can occur without notice or identified lawful authority, police can assist exclusion without a stated statutory power, and every corrective route can decline substance.

The constitutional concern is not that one court reached one adverse result. It is that the same failure of protection recurred across courts, tribunals, administration, policing and oversight, making the pattern visible only because the case passed through so many forums.

That is not equal protection before the law. It is enforcement without remedy. It makes Convention rights theoretical rather than practical and effective, hollows out Article 6 fairness, Article 8 home and family protection, A1P1 property rights and Article 14 equal protection, and turns equality before the law into an empty promise without machinery.

It creates foreseeable public-order risk. Where homes, evidence and property are taken without trial, police accountability or institutional responsibility for correction, confidence in lawful process is damaged at the point where the rule of law requires trust, restraint and legitimacy.

Form cannot defeat substance. Finality cannot defeat equity. Institutional closure cannot displace lawful adjudication. That position cannot be reconciled with natural justice, human rights, equal protection, the rule of law, access to justice, or the principle that justice must be seen to be done.

L. Final constitutional questions: equal protection, open justice and remedy

Open justice matters because justice must be capable of public verification. It is not satisfied by a public order, a sealed judgment or an appeal label if the record cannot show that the safeguards which make coercive orders lawful were actually applied.

Here, the schedules and record raise a direct verification problem. Fraud, forgery, escrow release, receiver authority, possession authority, police power, eviction legality, beneficiary rights and property deprivation were not tried with disclosure, native files, metadata, expert evidence, cross-examination and findings. Transcripts are missing. Disclosure was refused. Expert evidence was shut out. Police powers were not identified. Oversight bodies declined substance. Finality was then attached to untried premises.

The Ministry is therefore asked for identification, not reassurance. If the courts remain the answer, identify where the anterior issues were lawfully tried. If appeals remain the answer, identify how appeal remained effective where non-adjudication was treated as final adjudication. If complaints or oversight remain the answer, identify which body has power to correct the loss of home, property, evidence and intergenerational wealth. If judicial independence is the answer, explain how it supplies a remedy where the complaint is not disagreement with an outcome, but unequal forensic treatment and the withholding of ordinary safeguards.

The public-interest questions are therefore these.

First: if the legal system says equal protection exists, how is that reconciled with the attached schedules showing alleged unequal forensic treatment across more than twelve court and tribunal proceedings over five years of litigation — and where is the evidence that equal protection was actually applied here?

Second: if the Ministry cannot answer that question by identifying a real route of protection, correction or remedy, is the unavoidable consequence that open justice has become visibility without accountability, that equal protection before the law does not exist in substance for BAME property owners, and that property rights require some other effective constitutional protection where state institutions have failed to provide it?

This letter is published as an open letter because the issue is no longer private litigation alone. It concerns public confidence, access to justice, equal protection, police-backed property deprivation and whether the law's protective architecture operates in substance for BAME citizens.

Journalists, editors, legal commentators, parliamentarians and public-interest organisations who wish to examine the matter may request the pleadings, sealed orders, schedules, correspondence, photographs, video material, police complaints, oversight correspondence and documentary evidence relied upon. Disclosure will be provided subject to legal restrictions, privacy protection, safeguarding redactions and any applicable court rules. Enquiries may be sent to contact@timetofight.co.uk.

Yours faithfully,

Nicole Lawrence